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We prove the existence of an increasing equilibrium, and study the comparative statics of 
correlation in the k-double auction with affiliated private values. This is supposedly the 
simplest bilateral trading mechanism that allows for dependence in valuations between buyers 
and sellers. In the case k  ∈{0 ,1} there exists a unique equilibrium in non-dominated 
strategies. Using this equilibrium we show that correlation has a dual effect on strategic 
bidding. It might impose bidders to become more or less aggressive depending on their 
private valuation, and on the level of correlation. In the case k ∈ (0 ,1), we prove the existence 
of a family of strictly increasing equilibria, and demonstrate them using examples. Moreover, 
we show that equilibria in the case of independent private values are pointwise limits of 
equilibria with strictly affiliated private values. 
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The k-double auction (known also as a “call auction”) is the simplest, and probably the most
prevalent bilateral trade mechanism. Buyers and sellers submit sealed bids to a market organizer.
The organizer creates demand and supply schedules using the individual bids and oﬀers, and ﬁnds
a market clearing price. This price is determined by an exogenous parameter k ∈ [0,1].B u y e r s ,
who submitted bids higher than the market clearing price trade with sellers, who submitted oﬀers
lower than the market clearing price. This trading mechanism is used throughout the world as
an opening stage for trade in many stock exchanges such as NYSE, Toronto, Tokyo and others.
The two player k-double auction was ﬁrst introduced by Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983).
This mechanism has been extensively explored later on by Williams (1987), Satterthwaite and
Williams (1989a), and Leininger, Linhart, and Radner (1989). These papers show existence of
diﬀerent kinds of equilibria, and investigate their eﬃciency attributes. All of these papers assume
that the valuations of buyers and sellers are independent from one another. Other papers show the
implications of increasing the level of competition in this mechanism on market eﬃciency. These
include: Wilson (1985), Satterthwaite and Williams (1989b, 2002), Williams (1991), Rustichini,
Satterthwaite and Williams (1994), and Zacharias and Williams (2001). These papers assume
independent valuations as well.
Existence of equilibrium with correlated values has long been an open question. Of special
interest is the existence of equilibria with increasing strategies, as these seem to be appealing for
empirical implications. Recently, a few papers made major contributions to this area. Jackson
and Swinkels (2001) show existence of equilibrium in a large class of private and correlated values
double auctions. They allow for any number of buyers and sellers and do not require symmetry.
They do not, however, obtain monotonicity. Perry and Reny (2003) analyze a double auction with
common values in the case k ∈ {0,1}. They show existence of a non-decreasing equilibrium given
that the number of traders is suﬃciently large, and given that bids and oﬀers are restricted to a
discrete grid. Fundenberg, Mobius, and Szeidl (2003) show existence of an increasing symmetric
equilibrium in large private, and correlated value double auctions. The idea is that when the
number of traders is suﬃciently large, bids tend to truth telling, and therefore become strictly
increasing.
While these papers provide robust answers to the existence question under many circum-
1stances, there still are some open questions left:
1. Does there exist an increasing equilibrium when the number of traders is small, and val-
ues are correlated? In this case, strategic behavior is profound and it might destroy the
monotonicity of best response correspondences.
2. What is the nature of this equilibrium with correlated values, and how does correlation
aﬀect the bidding strategies? All the papers proving existence in correlated values double
auctions use powerful ﬁxed point arguments. These arguments, however, limit the analysis
of equilibrium and do not yield comparative statics with respect to the level of correlation.
3. Is it true that equilibria in the independent private values case can be approximated by
equilibria with correlated values?
In this paper we try to provide an answer to these questions by studying the two player
k-double auction with aﬃliated private values. Our main results are:
• Given some restrictions on the distribution of values, there exists an equilibrium in strictly
increasing strategies. In the case k ∈ {0,1} this equilibrium is unique, and a compact
support is not required. In the case k ∈ (0,1) there exists a family of strictly increasing
equilibria. The monotonicity of the equilibria relies heavily on the aﬃliation property that
we employ. We also deﬁne the “Bounded Association Property” (BAP). This property,
imposes a bound on the stochastic association between valuations. The BAP and the
aﬃliation property jointly imply that the objective functions of both players satisfy the
Spence-Mirrlees single crossing property. This result is of special interest as single crossing
properties are hard to obtain in double auction frameworks (see Perry and Reny (2003)).
This single crossing property is the key to our existence proof.
• Correlation has a dual eﬀect on strategic bidding. Higher correlation between private valu-
ations of buyers and sellers might cause them to become more or less aggressive depending
on their actual private valuation, and on the level of correlation. We show that this result
stems from two separate forces that arise from an increase in correlation. These two forces
might act in the same direction and reinforce one another, alternatively, they might act in
opposite directions. In the latter case, the dominant force, and therefore, the impact of
correlation is determined by the private values of agents.
2• Given our restrictions on the distributions, equilibria in the independent case are a pointwise
limit of equilibria with strictly aﬃliated values. This result is somewhat surprising because
aﬃliation is a strong type of positive correlation.
• We introduce a class of distribution functions (the FGM Copulas) to demonstrate our
existence result. These distributions are suitable for the study of double auctions with
aﬃliated values, because they allow for a change in the level of aﬃliation while keeping the
marginal distributions ﬁxed.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. In Section 3, we study the
case k ∈ {0,1}, prove the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium and study the dual impact of
correlation on bidding. In Section 3, we prove the existence of equilibrium in the case k ∈ (0,1),
and show how independent distribution functions can be be obtained as a limit of equilibria with
strictly aﬃliated values. Section 4 concludes.
2M o d e l
Suppose there are 2 agents. One of them is a seller, and the other is a buyer. The seller is
endowed with one unit of a good that he wants to sell, and the buyer wishes to buy one unit of
the same good. The two agents are engaged in the following mechanism. The buyer writes his
bid (denoted by b), and the seller writes her oﬀer (denoted by s) on pieces of paper. A referee
then opens these pieces of papers. If it happens that b ≥ s, then the seller sells the good to the
buyer at a price of kb +( 1− k)s, where k ∈ [0,1] is a predetermined number, that is common
knowledge. If b<sthere is no transaction and both agents earn zero.
Before submitting their bids, both agents ﬁnd out their private valuations of the good. We
denote by x, the value of the good to the seller and by y, the value of the good to the buyer. These
valuations are drawn from a joint distribution of two random variables X and Y,with joint density
f(x,y).1 T h es u p p o r to ff(·,·) is assumed to be D×D ,w h e r eD ⊂ R is an interval (possibly
an unbounded interval). Denote: f(x|y) ≡ f(X = x|Y = y), and f(y|x)=f(Y = y|X = x) the
conditional densities of buyers and sellers given their valuations on their rivals valuations.
1Capital letters: X and Y are used to denote random variables while small letters: x and y are used as speciﬁc
realizations of X and Y .
3Both agents are risk neutral, and each one of them is only informed of his own valuation.
The density function f and the rules of the game are common knowledge. We also introduce the







Denote by R1(x|y) and R2(x|y) the partial derivatives of R(x|y) with respect to x and y respec-
tively. Similarly, denote by T1(y|x) and T2(y|x) the partial derivatives of T(y|x) with respect to
y and x respectively. Notice that R1(x|y) > 0 for all x,y ∈ D i fa n do n l yi fF(x|y) is log-concave
over D for all y ∈ D. A parallel argument applies to T(y|x).
We make the following assumptions regarding the distributions of valuations:
A1. For all x,y ∈ D, f(x,y),f (x|y), and f(y|x) are strictly positive and C2.
A2. 1+R1(x|y) > 0 for all x,y ∈ D and 1+T1(y|x) > 0 for all x,y ∈ D.
A3. The support of f(x|y) is D for all y ∈ D, and the support of and f(y|x) is D for all x ∈ D.
A4. f has the aﬃliation property: for all x1,x 2,y 1,y 2 ∈ D, such that x1 <x 2,y 1 <y 2 we have:
f(x1,y 1)f(x2,y 2) ≥ f(x1,y 2)f(x2,y 1).
Assumption A1 is standard. Assumption A2 is restrictive, however as noted before, it is
slightly less stringent than requiring that the conditional distribution functions would be log-
concave. Assumption A3 requires that the information that an agent possesses does not aﬀect
the support of the conditional distribution on his rivals values. Assumption A4 roughly means
that high values of x a r es t o c h a s t i c a l l ya s s o c i a t e dw i t hh i g hv a l u e so fy. I ti se q u i v a l e n ti n
our case (two random variables) to stating that f has the monotone likelihood ratio property
(MLRP), i.e. for all y1 >y 2, f(x|y1)/f(x|y2) is non-decreasing in y. Assumptions A1 and A2 were
originally introduced by Satterthwaite and Williams (1989a) to study the case of independent
values. Assumption A4 is the one that distinguishes this paper from theirs and enables us to
study the impact of correlation on bidding.2 Distribution functions that satisfy assumptions
A1-A4 will be called - admissible distributions.
2Notice that A4 is trivially satisﬁed when x and y are independent; thus our setting generalizes the independent
values case.
4Since each trader is only aware of his own valuation, we may view this valuation as the trader’s
type. Thus, we model this interaction as a game of incomplete information following Harsanyi
(1967-1968). A strategy for the seller is a function S : D → D that assigns an oﬀer price S(x) to
each valuation x. A strategy for the buyer is a function B : D → D that assigns a bid price B(y)
to each valuation y.
Suppose that given a valuation x and a strictly increasing (hence invertible) buyer’s strategy




[kB(y)+( 1− k)s − x]f(y|x)dy (1)
Similarly, the expected proﬁt to the buyer given valuation y, a seller’s strategy S(·) and a bid




[y − (kb+( 1− k)S(x))]f(x|y)dx (2)
A pair of strictly increasing strategies (S,B) forms a Bayesian equilibrium if each strategy is a
best response to the other.3
3 The Dual Impact of Correlation
We start by analyzing the case k ∈ {0,1}. This case is easier to analyze, and it will enable us to
better understand the impact of correlation on bidding. We shall study the case k =1 ,k n o w n
as the “buyer’s bid double auction”. The case k =0is parallel. Williams (1987) notes that in
the buyer’s bid double auction, truth telling, i.e. S(x)=x, is a weakly dominant strategy for the
seller. Although Williams worked in an independent private values environment, his argument
is intact in our framework as well. Hereafter, we assume that the seller adopts this dominant
strategy. Given this assumption, (2) simpliﬁes to:
πb(b,y)=( y − b)F(b|y) (3)
An equilibrium in this setting is a buyer’s strategy B(·) that forms a best response to the
seller’s dominant strategy, namely:
B(y) ∈ argmax
b∈D
π(b,y) for all y ∈ D (4)
3Notice that we restrict attention to strictly increasing strategies. We vindicate this approach later on by
showing that equilibria in strictly increasing strategies do exist.
5N o t i c et h a ts i n c ew ed i dn o tc o n ﬁne ourselves to bounded supports, it is not clear a priori that
π(b,y) admits a maximum, and thus, (4) might not be well deﬁned. However, it turns out that
the admissibility of f assures us that a unique maximum is admitted in the support, therefore
(4) is indeed well deﬁned, and a unique, and strictly increasing equilibrium exists. We claim:
Proposition 1 Consider the buyer’s bid double auction. Suppose f is admissible, and the seller
uses her dominant strategy. The following holds:
1. There exists a unique equilibrium strategy B(·). This strategy is given implicitly by the
equation: B(y)=y − R(B(y)|y).
2. The equilibrium strategy B(·) is strictly increasing and C1.
Before proving this proposition, the following lemma is needed.
Lemma 1 (see Milgrom and Weber (1982), Lemma 1) Suppose f has the aﬃliation property,
then R2(x|y) ≤ 0 for all x,y ∈ D.4
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
Part 1:D i ﬀerentiate (3) with respect to b to obtain the ﬁrst order condition for a maximum:
−F(b|y)+( y − b)f(b|y)=0 , or equivalently: b = y − R(b|y). This yields an implicit relation
between y and b.D e ﬁne:
H(b,y) ≡ b + R(b|y) − y
Diﬀerentiating H(b,y) with respect to b and applying A3 yields:
∂H(b,y)
∂b =1+R1(b|y) > 0.
Therefore, the conditions for the implicit function theorem are satisﬁed, and b may be written as
a function of y. Denote this function by B(y). As required we have:
B(y)=y − R(B(y)|y) y ∈ D (5)
So far we have shown that B(y) is a local extremum for π(b,y). We shall now show that this
extremum is a maximum, and that it is unique, i.e. a global maximum.
4Recall that R2(x|y) denotes the partial derivative of R(x|y) with respect to y.
6Let y0 ∈ D. For any b ∈ D we have:
∂π(b,y0)
∂b
= −F(b|y0)+( y0 − b)f(b|y0)=f(b|y0)[y0 − (b + R(b|y0))] (6)
Substituting b = B(y0) in (6) yields
∂π(b,y0)
∂b =0 .A l s o b y A 3 ,
∂π(b,y0)
∂b moves from positive to
negative when we increase b. Therefore, B(y0) is a unique global maximum.












Therefore, the equilibrium strategy is strictly increasing.
Notice that the mere existence of equilibrium follows without the aﬃliation property. However,
it is the aﬃliation that makes this equilibrium increasing.
The fact that the unique equilibrium is given by an implicit function limits our ability to
analyze it. Thus, in order to get better intuition on the impact of correlation on bidding we
shall adopt a speciﬁc functional form for the joint distribution of values - the bivariate normal
distribution. Speciﬁcally, suppose (X,Y) have a non-singular bivariate normal distribution with
identical marginals.5 Speciﬁcally, we assume that the marginals possess identical means: µX =
µY ≡ µ ∈ R, identical variances σ2
X = σ2
Y ≡ σ2 > 0, and that the correlation between X and Y
is ρ ∈ [0,1).



































2π(1 − ρ2)σ2 exp−
[x − µ − ρ(y − µ)]
2
2(1 − ρ2)σ2 (7)
5We restrict the analysis to identical marginals only to save notation. All the results apply also to bivariate
normal distributions with non-identical marginals.
7Or equivalently: (X|Y = y) ∼ N
¡
µ + ρ(y − µ),(1 − ρ2)σ2¢
.
The following lemma establishes the admissibility of the bivariate normal distribution.
Lemma 2 Suppose that (X,Y) have a non-singular bivariate normal distribution, such that the
correlation between X and Y is non-negative, then the joint distribution f(x,y) is admissible.
Proof. A1 is satisﬁed trivially. A2 follows from the fact that the univariate normal distribution
is log-concave (see Tong (1978)). A3 follows from the fact that the support of any conditional
normal is R. A4 follows from the fact that with the bivariate normal distribution, the aﬃliation
property is equivalent to non-negative correlation (see Tong (1990) page 20).
Having established the admissibility of the normal distribution, it follows from Proposition 1
that there exists a unique equilibrium strategy B(y), g i v e ni m p l i c i t l yb yB(y)=y − R(B(y)|y)
for all y ∈ R.
The symmetric bivariate normal distribution is characterized by three parameters: the mar-
ginal mean: µ, the marginal standard deviation: σ, and the correlation ρ. Our objective is to
gauge the impact of ρ on B(·). In order to perform this analysis we view B(·) as a function of y
and ρ: B(y;ρ). Our objective then, is to ﬁnd the sign of
∂B(y;ρ)
∂ρ . The next proposition establishes
this task. It demonstrates the dual role of correlation on bidding. Before presenting it formally,
let us discuss the intuition behind it.
Suppose the buyer’s valuation is high (higher than the marginal mean µ).F r o mt h ep o i n to f
view of the buyer, an increase in correlation means that the seller’s valuation is more likely to
be high. On the other hand, if the buyer’s valuation is low (lower than the marginal mean µ),
an increase in correlation increases the odds that the seller’s valuation is low too. Thus, on a
ﬁrst glance, it seems that an increase in correlation should increase the buyer’s bid if the buyer’s
valuation is high, and decrease the bid if the buyer’s valuation is low. In other words, an increase
in correlation should make the buyer less aggressive if his valuation is high, and more aggressive if
his valuation is low. However, the buyer’s behavior is driven by yet another force. Regardless of
whether the buyer’s valuation is high or low, an increase in correlation increases the probability
that the valuation of the buyer and the seller are “close”. Thus, the higher the correlation, the
less tempting is strategic shading of bids for the buyer. Put diﬀerently, the higher the correlation,
the more apprehensive is the buyer, because he might “miss” the seller’s oﬀer. Thus, there are
8two forces that power the strategic behavior of the buyer. If the buyer’s valuation is high, the two
forces act in the same direction. Therefore, the higher the correlation the higher (less aggressive)
is the bid. If the buyer’s valuation is low, the two forces act in opposite direction. On the
one hand, an increase in correlation makes the buyer more aggressive because he assigns higher
probability to the event that the seller’s valuation is low too. On the other hand, he becomes less
aggressive because he might “miss” the seller’s oﬀer. When the level of correlation is low, the
ﬁrst force dominates and therefore, an increase in correlation makes the buyer bid lower (more
aggressively). When the level of correlation is high, the second force dominates and an increase
in correlation makes the buyer bid higher (less aggressively).
The following proposition formalizes these intuitions:
Proposition 2 Let B(y;ρ) be the equilibrium bidding strategy of the buyer. The following holds:
1. The impact of correlation on bidding can be decomposed into two components as follows:
∂
∂ρ
B(y;ρ)=( y − µ)A1(y;ρ)+ρA2(y;ρ) (8)
where A1(·,·) and A2(·,·) are strictly positive expressions.
2. If y ≥ µ then an increase in correlation increases the bid:
∂B(
∂ρ (y; ρ) > 0 for all ρ ∈ [0,1).
3. If y = µ then
∂B(
∂ρ (y;ρ) > 0 for all ρ ∈ (0,1),a n d
∂B(
∂ρ (y; ρ)=0for ρ =0 .









The proof is in the Appendix.
Part 1 of Proposition 2 formalizes the decomposition of the correlation eﬀect into two separate
eﬀects. The ﬁrst eﬀect is (y − µ)A1(y;µ). It formalizes the intuition that with high valuation
(y>µ ), an increase in correlation increases the bid, and with low valuation (y<µ ),a ni n c r e a s e
in correlation decreases the bid. The second eﬀect is ρA2(y;ρ).T h i se ﬀect is always non-negative,
and is equal to zero if and only if ρ =0 .S i n c eρ is non-negative, and A1,A 2 are strictly positive,
9w eg e tt h a tt h et w oe ﬀects act in the same direction when y ≥ µ (this is stated in parts 2 and 3 of
the proposition). When y<µthe two eﬀects act in opposite directions. Part 4 of the proposition
shows that when ρ is close to zero, the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates. Part 5 shows that for values of ρ
close to 1, the second eﬀect dominates.
Figure 1 illustrates this proposition. The parameter values are assumed to be: µ =0and
σ =5 .T h e ﬁgure presents the optimal bid (calculated numerically) for two values of y, and
for varying levels of correlation. The left box presents the optimal bid for y =5(one standard
deviation to the right of the mean), and the right box presents the optimal bid for y = −5 (one
standard deviation to the left). The qualitative diﬀerence between these two cases is apparent: in
the case y =5(high valuation) the bid is monotone increasing in correlation. In this case, both
forces powered by the change in correlation act in the same direction. In the case y = −5,t h e
bid decreases for low levels of correlation and increases for high levels of correlation. In this case,
the two forces act in opposite direction. The bid is more aggressive for low levels of correlation
and less aggressive for high levels of correlation. In both cases, the bid tends to y (truth telling)
as we approach perfect correlation.
Figure 2 demonstrates the joint eﬀect of value and correlation on the bid. For any ﬁxed level
of correlation, the bid is increasing in value. For ﬁxed low values, the bid is decreasing and then
increasing in correlation. For ﬁxed high values, the bid is strictly increasing in correlation.
4 Equilibrium in the Case k ∈ (0,1)
In this section, we restrict attention to the case k ∈ (0,1).T h i si sb yf a ram o r ed i ﬃcult case,
since both the buyer and the seller aﬀect the price by changing their bid. In order to simplify
matters, we assume that D is compact and is given by the closed interval [0,1].I ti se a s yt oc h e c k
that if (S,B) form an equilibrium in strictly increasing strategies, then for all x ∈ [0,1] such that
given a seller’s value of x the probability of trade is positive, we have S(x) ≥ x. Similarly, for all y
∈ [0,1] such that given a buyer’s value of y, the probability of trade is positive, we have B(y) ≤ y.
If x ≥ B(1), then given a seller’s valuation of x, the probability of trade is zero. Similarly, if
y ≤ S(0), then given a buyer’s valuation of y the probability of trade is 0. For these values that
imply zero probability of trade, the strategies (S,B) may be changed arbitrarily in the no-trade


























Figure 1: Impact of Change in Correlation on the Optimal Bid






















Figure 2: The Joint Impact of Correlation and Value on the Optimal Bid
11attention to diﬀerentiable equilibrium strategies that satisfy the following properties:
B1. S and B are continuous and strictly increasing.
B2. x ≤ S(x) ≤ 1 for all x ∈ [0,1].
B3. 0 ≤ B(y) ≤ y for all y ∈ [0,1].
B4. S(x)=x whenever x ≥ B(1).
B5. B(y)=y whenever y ≤ S(0).
B6. S is C2 on [0,B(1)].
B7. B is C2 on [S(0),1].
A strategy pair will be termed regular if it satisﬁes B1-B7. A regular equilibrium is an
equilibrium with regular strategies. Our goal is to prove existence of a regular equilibrium given
the admissibility of distribution functions. In order to do this, we have to introduce another
restriction on the joint distribution of valuations. This restriction limits the amount of stochastic
association between valuations of the buyer and the seller. To get the intuition for this restriction,
consider the following comparative statics exercise. Suppose the buyer faces an increase in value
from y1 to y2. Given the aﬃliation of values, he conjectures that the value of the seller has
increased as well (on average). If the increase in value to the seller is steep, and given that the
seller uses an increasing strategy the price which is a convex combination of the two bids will
increase steeply. This implies that the buyer might ﬁnd it optimal to set a bid B(y2) lower than
the original bid B(y1), in order compensate for the high increase in sellers oﬀer. But this will
contradict the assumption of increasing strategies. A parallel argument applies to the seller. By
restricting the stochastic association of valuation we can prevent this kind of aggressive reactions,
and assure existence of increasing pairs of equilibrium.











12The intuition behind the deﬁnition of the bounded association property is straightforward. The
expression ηx|y(x,y) represents the elasticity of f(x|y) with respect to y. The higher is this
elasticity, the higher is the impact of a change in y on f. Thus, imposing a bound on ηx|y(x,y)
is a way to limit the stochastic association between X and Y. A similar argument applies to
ηy|x(x,y).N o t i c et h a ti fX and Y are independent, then (9) and (10) are satisﬁed trivially since
in this case f2(x|y)=f2(y|x)=0 . As independent variables are aﬃliated it follows that the
set of distribution functions that have both the aﬃliation property and the bounded association
property is non-empty. Moreover, by taking any pair of independent random variables and
changing them slightly in a continuous manner, we can make them strictly aﬃliated in a way
that the bounded association property will be preserved. We will demonstrate this process later
on.
Based on the discussion above, we introduce the following additional requirement from the
distribution of values:
A5. f(x,y) has the bounded association property.
In the rest of the paper, a distribution function will be called admissible if it satisﬁes assump-
tions A1-A5.
The ﬁrst step in proving existence of equilibrium is to provide necessary conditions for equi-
librium. These conditions are parallel to the original conditions of Chatterjee and Samuelson
(1983), and are given in the next proposition.
Proposition 3 Let f be admissible, and set k ∈ (0,1).I f (S,B) is a regular equilibrium in a
k−double auction, then the following two diﬀerential equations are satisﬁed for x ≤ B(1) and
y ≥ S(0).
kS0(x)R(x|B−1(S(x)) + S(x)=B−1(S(x)) (11)
(1 − k)B0(y)T(y|S−1(B(y)) + B(y)=S−1(B(y)). (12)
The proof is similar to the proof given in Satterthwaite and Williams (1989a), and is therefore
omitted.
The main step in proving existence of equilibrium is to show that conditions (11) and (12)
are actually suﬃcient for equilibrium. It is stated in the next proposition.
13Proposition 4 Let k ∈ (0,1) and suppose that (S,B) is a pair of regular strategies. If for all
x ≤ B(1) and y ≥ S(0), (11)-(12) are satisﬁed, then (S,B) form a regular equilibrium.
The proof of this proposition is in the Appendix. We provide here a short outline of the
proof to make clear the need for the aﬃliation and bounded association properties. Consider any
solution (B,S) to the set of diﬀerential equations (11) and (12). In order to show that (B,S) is
an equilibrium we must show that B(y) is a global maximum of (2) given S,a n dy. To show this,
we proceed in two steps. First we show that B(y) is a local maximum. This is done by an analysis
of the ﬁrst and second order conditions of the objective functions. The aﬃliation property plays
a major role in proving that the second order condition for a local maximum is satisﬁed. Then,
in order to show that the local maximum is actually global, we make use of a single crossing
property of the objective functions. Let h(a,z):D×D→ R be a C2 function. We say that
h has the Spence-Mirrlees single crossing property if:
∂2h(a,z)
∂a∂z > 0. Here comes the need for
both the aﬃliation property and the bounded association property. These two properties jointly
imply that the objective functions of both the buyer and the seller satisfy the single crossing
property whenever the buyer’s bid is lower than his value, and the seller’s oﬀer is higher than
her value. This in turn implies that any solution to the pair of diﬀerential equations is indeed an
equilibrium.
Equipped with the suﬃciency of the diﬀerential equations, we can now follow Sattertwaite and
Williams (1989a, Theorem 3.2) and use a standard existence result from the theory of diﬀerential
equations to deduce the existence of a large family of equilibria in the two person k-double auction
with aﬃliated and private values. Thus, we have proved:
Proposition 5 Suppose k ∈ (0,1) and f is admissible. There exists a regular equilibrium in the
two person k-double auction.
In order to demonstrate this result we present a class of distribution functions that satisfy the
admissibility conditions. This class of distributions is known as the Farlie-Gumbel-Morgenstern
(FGM) Copulas. It is studied deeply in Kotz et al. (2000), and Mari and Kotz (2001). Let us
start with the following simple example: Let α ∈ [0,1) and for all x,y ∈ [0,1] deﬁne:
Fα(x,y)=xy[1 + α(1 − x)(1 − y)]
14It is easy to verify that F is a distribution function with support [0,1]2, having density
fα(x,y)=1+α(1−2x)(1−2y). Moreover, the marginals of this distribution are uniform on [0,1]
regardless of α. It follows that the conditional distributions satisfy: fα(x|y)=fα(y|x)=fα(x,y).
Figure 3 depicts the joint density function for the case α =0 .1.T h ec a s eα =0is the familiar
two dimensional independent uniform distributions. When we increase α, X and Y cease to be
independent but fα maintains the aﬃliation property. To see this, assume that x1,x 2,y 1,y 2 ∈
[0,1] such that: x2 >x 1, y2 >y 1. Then:
fα(x1,y 1)fα(x2,y 2) − fα(x1,y 2)fα(x2,y 1)=4 α(x2 − x1)(y2 − y1) > 0 for all α ∈ (0,1).
The aﬃliation property can be readily noticed in Figure 3. High (low) values of x are stochastically
associated with high (low) values of y.
Notice that in the case α =0we have: R(x|y)=x and T(y|x)=y − 1 for all x,y ∈ [0,1].
It follows that 1+R1(x|y)=1+T1(y|x)=2> 0. This implies that there exists an α1 > 0 such
that A2 is satisﬁed for all α ∈ [0,α 1].M o r e o v e r , f o r α =0 : ηx|y(x,y)=ηy|x(x,y)=0for all
x,y ∈ [0,1]. This implies that A5 is satisﬁed in this case. Moreover, there exists an α2 > 0 such
that A5 is satisﬁed for all α ∈ [0,α 2].B yc h o o s i n gα0 =m i n ( α1,α 2) > 0 we conclude that fα(·|·)
is admissible for all α ∈ [0,α 0]. A tedious calculation shows that one can choose for example
α0 =0 .2. Thus, Proposition 5 implies that for all α ∈ [0,0.2] and valuations distributed according
to Fα a regular equilibrium exists.
The same line of reasoning implies that for any pair of independent distribution functions for
which an equilibrium can be constructed using the methodology of Satterthwaite and Williams
(1989a), one can construct a family of distribution functions satisfying the aﬃliation property
for which an equilibrium exists. Moreover, the equilibrium in the independent case is a pointwise
limit of equilibria with strictly aﬃliated valuations. Indeed, let F1(x) and F2(y) be a pair of
independent distribution functions over [0,1] with densities f1(x) and f2(y). Then for all α ∈ [0,1)
deﬁne:
Fα(x,y)=F1(x)F2(y)[1 + α(1 − F1(x))(1 − F2(y))].
Fα is a distribution function with density fα(x,y)=f1(x)f2(y)[1+α(1−2F1(x))(1−2F2(y))],
and it satisﬁes the aﬃliation property. The marginals of Fα(·,·) are F1 and F2 regardless of α.
The case α =0corresponds to the base case in which X and Y are independent, while for any
















Figure 3: The Joint Density of the FGM Copula for α =0 .1


















Figure 4: Convergence to the Linear Equilibrium
16Proposition 6 Consider any pair of independent random variables with a joint distribution
function F0(x,y) satisfying assumptions A1-A2. There exists an α0 > 0 such that for all α ∈
[0,α 0], Fα(x,y) satisﬁes assumptions A1-A5, and is therefore admissible (with strict aﬃliation).
It follows that for all α ∈ [0,α 0], a regular equilibrium exists. Moreover, any equilibrium in the
independent case is a pointwise limit of equilibria with strict aﬃliation.
Figure 4 demonstrates this result. It presents equilibrium strategies in double auctions with
strictly aﬃliated values, converging to the well known linear equilibrium of Chatterjee and
Samuelson (1983). These equilibria were calculated using the numerical technique presented
in Satterthwaite and Williams (1989a).
5C o n c l u s i o n s
The two player k-double auction mechanism is probably the simplest bilateral trading mechanism.
Still, the analysis of this mechanism sheds light on strategic interaction within two sided trading
in general. In this paper we have shown existence of equilibrium, and studied the impact of
correlation on bidding.
Extending the results to the case of more than just one trader on each side of the market does
not seem straightforward. Still, it seems that the intuitions gained by this paper should carry
on to more elaborate environments. In particular, the two-fold eﬀect of correlation on bidding
is highly intuitive and should be present in double auctions with multiple traders. This eﬀect,
however, will be moderated by the forces of competition.
We expect that future work will analyze the double auction mechanism under diﬀerent valua-
tion structures. In particular, it would be interesting to understand equilibrium in double auction
mechanisms with common values.
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6A p p e n d i x
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
Part 1: Set H(b,y;ρ)=b + R(b|y;ρ) − y = b +
F(b|y;ρ)
f(b|y;ρ) − y.F r o m P r o p o s i t i o n 2 w e k n o w































































(b − µ − ρ(y − µ))2 − (α − µ − ρ(y − µ))2¤
f(α|y;ρ)dα
(1 − ρ2)2σ2f(b|y;ρ)
Then from (13) and (14) we have:
∂B(y;ρ)
∂ρ
=( y − µ)A1(y;ρ)+ρA2(y;ρ).
It is left to be shown that A1(·,·) and A2(·,·) are strictly positive. Notice that by A3, 1+R1(b|y;ρ)
is positive for any b ∈ R.A l s o ,
R b
−∞(α − b)f(α|y;ρ)dα is clearly negative for any b ∈ R.T h i s
implies that A1(·,·) is strictly negative.





(b − µ − ρ(y − µ))2 − (α − µ − ρ(y − µ))2¤
f(α|y;ρ)dα
It is suﬃcient to show that Ψ is strictly negative. To see this notice that f(·|y;ρ) is symmetric
around the conditional mean: µ + ρ(y − µ). We consider two cases:
Case 1: b ≤ µ+ρ(y−µ).I nt h i sc a s e ,f o ra l lα<b : (α−µ−ρ(y−µ))2 > (b−µ−ρ(y−µ))2,
and Ψ is clearly negative.












(b − µ − ρ(y − µ))2 − (α − µ − ρ(y − µ))2¤
f(α|y;ρ)dα
The ﬁrst term is positive using the argument of Case 1, whereas the second term is zero by the
symmetry around µ + ρ(y − µ).T h u s , Ψ is again strictly negative. This shows that A2(·,·) is
strictly positive as required.
Parts 2 and 3: Follow directly from part 1.
Part 4: Suppose now that y<µ .If we set ρ =0 ,w eg e t : ∂
∂ρB(y;ρ)=( y−µ)A1(y;ρ) < 0.B y
the continuity of A1(·,·) , there exists a right neighborhood of 0: [0, ˆ ρ) such that this inequality
is true for each ρ ∈ [0, ˆ ρ).
Part 5: The following 2 lemmas are needed ﬁrst.
20Lemma 3 Let {ρn} be a sequence of positive correlations such that ρn → 1.S u p p o s e t h a t f o r








Proof. The numerator may be written as follows:
[α − µ − ρn(y − µ)+B(y;ρn) − µ − ρn(y − µ)](α − B(y;ρn),
which is strictly positive under the assumption. Since the denominator tends to zero from above,
the ratio tends to minus inﬁnity, and the whole expression tends to zero.
Lemma 4 Let {ρn} be a sequence of positive correlations such that ρn → 1, and suppose that for
all n large enough, B(y;ρn) <µ+ ρn(y − µ).T h e n lim
n→∞B(y;ρn)=y.

























The integrand of this expression is identically zero, whenever α ≥ B(y;ρn),a n db yL e m m a
3 it tends to zero whenever α<B (y;ρn). Therefore, for any α ∈ R, the integrand tends
to zero as n tends to inﬁnity. Also, the integrand is uniformly bounded by 1,t h u sf r o mt h e
bounded convergence theorem we obtain that R(B(y;ρn)|y;ρn) → 0. By (5) this implies that
lim
n→∞B(y;ρn)=y, as required.
We turn now to the proof of Part 5. We will show that for any sequence of correlations {ρn}
such that ρn → 1, lim
n→∞B(y;ρn)=y. Indeed, let {ρn} be such a sequence. We shall decompose




B(y;ρnk) <µ+ ρnk(y − µ) for k =1 ,2,3,... (16)
B(y;ρnj) ≥ µ + ρnj(y − µ) for j =1 ,2,3,... (17)
6It may happen that one of these sub-sequences has a ﬁnite number of members. The argument that follows is
adequate for this situation as well, with minor changes.
21By Lemma 4 we have: limk→∞ B(y;ρnk)=y.
From (5) and (16) we have: µ+ρnj(y−µ) ≤ B(y;ρnj) <yfor j =1 ,2,3,.... By the sandwich
rule we obtain: lim
j→∞
B(y;ρnj)=y. Since both the sub-sequences converge to y, B(y;ρn) converges
to y as well.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :
We ﬁrst prove the following three lemmas.
Lemma 5 Suppose k ∈ (0,1),fis admissible, and suppose that (S,B) is a regular pair of
strategies that satisﬁes the diﬀerential equations (11) and (12) for all x ≤ B(1) and y ≥ S(0).
Then:
1. For all x ∈ [0,B(1)] : s = S(x) is a local maximizer of πs(s,x,B).
2. For all y ∈ [S(0),1] : b = B(y) is a local maximizer of πb(b,y,S).
Proof. Let (S,B) be a regular pair of strategies that satisﬁes (11) and (12). Let y0 ∈ [S(0),1]
































For b0 = B(y0), (19) is equal to zero; thus B(y0) satisﬁes the F.O.C for a local maximum. We
































and Λ(b,y) ≡ (b − B−1(b))Γ(b,y)+y − b.

















Now substitute b0 = B(y0).W e h a v e Γ(B(y0),y 0)=1and Λ(B(y0),y 0)=0 .H e n c e , b y u s i n g












From lemma 1 and since B(y0) ≤ y0 it follows that the term in brackets is strictly positive.
Therefore, since Ψ(B(y0),y 0) is positive and B0(y0) is positive, we conclude that the second order
condition for a local maximum is satisﬁed.
The proof for the seller is parallel.
Lemma 6 Suppose k ∈ (0,1),fis admissible, and suppose that (S,B) is a regular pair of
strategies, then:
1. πs(s,x,B) satisﬁes the Spence-Mirrlees single crossing property with respect to s and x for
all x ∈ [0,B(1)],a n ds ∈ [S(0),B(1)] such that x ≤ s.
2. πb(b,y,S) satisﬁes the Spence-Mirrlees single crossing property with respect to b and y for
all y ∈ [S(0),1] and b ∈ [S(0),B(1)] such that y ≥ b.
23Proof. We shall provide a proof for πb(b,y,S). The proof for πs(s,x,B) is parallel.







[f(S−1(b0)|y0)+( y0 − b0)f2(S−1(b0)|y0)].
From the fact that f has the aﬃliation property (A.4) it follows that F2(x|y) < 0 for all x,y ∈ D
(see Milgrom (1981)). In particular, kF2(S−1(b0)|y0)) < 0. Consider now two cases:
Case 1: f2(S−1(b0)|y0) ≥ 0. In this case, from the fact that y0 ≥ b0 it follows that
f(S−1(b0)|y0)+( y0 − b0)f2(S−1(b0)|y0) > 0.
Case 2: f2(S−1(b0)|y0) < 0. The bounded association property implies that f(S−1(b0)|y0)+
y0f2(S−1(b0)|y0) > 0, and since 0 ≤ y0−b0 <y 0 we have: f(S−1(b0)|y0)+(y0−b0)f2(S−1(b0)|y0) >
0.
We conclude that in both cases: f(S−1(b0)|y0)+( y0 − b0)f2(S−1(b0)|y0) > 0 and since
S0(S−1(b0)) > 0 we get that
∂2πb(b0,y0)
∂b∂y > 0 as required.
Lemma 7 Suppose k ∈ (0,1),fis admissible, and suppose that (S,B) is a regular pair of
strategies that satisﬁes the diﬀerential equations (11) and (12) for all x ∈ [0,B(1)] and y ∈
[S(0),1]. Then:
1. For all x ∈ [0,B(1)],S (x) ∈ argmax{πs(s,x,B):s ∈ [S(0),B(1)]}.
2. For all y ∈ [S(0),1],B (y) ∈ argmax{πb(b,y,S):b ∈ [S(0),B(1)]}.
Proof. We shall prove the second part. The proof of the ﬁrst part is parallel.
Let y0 ∈ [S(0),1]. From lemma 5 it follows that b0 ≡ B(y0) is a local maximizer of πb(b,y0,S).
Also, from the regularity of (S,B) it follows that b0 ∈ [S(0),B(1)]. Suppose, on the contrary, that
the global maximizer of πb(b,y0,S) over [S(0),B(1)] is b1 ∈ [S(0),B(1)], and that πb(b1,y 0,S) >
πb(b0,y 0,S).S i n c eB is continuous, and assumes all values in [S(0),B(1)], it follows that there
exists a y1 ∈ [S(0),1] such that B(y1)=b1. From the regularity of B, it follows that y0 ≥ b0 and
y1 ≥ b1. Also, from the fact that b1 is a global maximizer of πb(b,y0,S) it follows that b1 ≤ y0,
for if b1 >y 0 we can choose a slightly lower bid that will strictly increase πb(b,y0,S). We consider
two cases:
24Case 1: b1 >b 0.S i n c e B is regular, it is strictly increasing. Therefore: y1 >y 0.S i n c e b1
is a global maximizer of πb(b,y0,S), and because b1 >b 0 it follow that:
∂πb(b1,y0,S)
∂b ≥ 0.F r o m
Lemma 6, and since b1 ≤ y0 <y 1 it follows that
∂2πb(b1,y,S)
∂y∂b > 0 for all y ∈ [y0,y 1].I tf o l l o w st h a t
∂πb(b1,y1,S)
∂b > 0.H o w e v e r ,B(y1)=b1 implies that
∂πb(b1,y1,S)
∂b =0 . A contradiction.
Case 2: b1 <b 0.S i n c eB is strictly increasing, we get y1 <y 0.S i n c eb1 is a global maximizer
of πb(b,y0,S), and because b1 <b 0 it follow that:
∂πb(b1,y0,S)
∂b ≤ 0.W e h a v e b1 ≤ y1 <y 0.
Therefore, Lemma 6 implies that
∂2πb(b1,y,S)
∂y∂b for all y ∈ [y1,y 0]. It follows that
∂πb(b1,y1,S)
∂b < 0.
However, B(y1)=b1 implies that
∂πb(b1,y1,S)
∂b =0 . Again a contradiction.
It follows that b0 ∈ argmax{πb(b,y0,S):b ∈ [S(0),B(1)]} as required.
We now turn to the proof of the proposition.
Let k ∈ (0,1) and suppose that (S,B) is a pair of regular strategies that satisﬁes (11) and
(12) for all x ≤ B(1) and y ≥ S(0).L e ty0 ∈ [0,1] be a buyers valuation. We will show that it is
optimal for the buyer to bid B(y0) given that the seller uses the strategy S. The proof for the
seller’s strategy is similar. Consider two cases:
Case 1: y0 ∈ [0,S(0)]. In this case, in order to get a positive probability of trade the buyer
must submit a bid higher than his valuation: b0 >y 0. However, this will induce πb(b0,y 0,S) to
be negative. While by choosing b0 = B(y0)=y0, the buyer assures himself a zero payoﬀ.
Case 2: y0 ∈ [S(0),1]. In this case, we know from Lemma 7 that b0 = B(y0) is the optimal
choice of the buyer over [S(0),B(1)]. Thus, in order to prove our result we need to show that
there is no ˆ b ∈ (B(1),1] such that π(ˆ b,y0,S) >π (ˆ b,y0,S). In order to show this it is suﬃcient to
show that
∂π(b,y0,S)
∂b ≤ 0 for all b ∈ (B(1),1].L e tˆ b ∈ (B(1),1]. By the regularity of S, it follows
that S−1(ˆ b)=ˆ b,a n dS0(ˆ b)=1 .B yd i ﬀerentiating (2) we obtain:
∂πb(ˆ b,y0,S)
∂b
= −kF(ˆ b|y0)+( y0 −ˆ b)f(ˆ b|y0)=f(ˆ b|y0)[y0 −ˆ b − kR(ˆ b|y0)].
Now, from A3 it follows that
∂πb(b,y0,S)
∂b is strictly decreasing in b for b ∈ (B(1),1].T h e r e -
fore, it is suﬃcient to show that
∂πb(B(1),y0,S)
∂b ≤ 0.I f y0 =1 , then we are done, because
∂πb(B(y0),y0,S)
∂b =0 . Suppose, then, that y0 < 1, hence: B(1) >B (y0), and suppose on the
contrary that
∂πb(B(1),y0,S)
∂b > 0. It follows that B(1) ≤ y0, for otherwise an increase in the bid
would decrease πb(b,y0,S). Thus, we have: B(1) ≤ y0 < 1. From Lemma 6 it follows that
∂2πb(B(1),y,S)




∂b > 0.B u tt h i s
25contradicts the fact that B(1) is a local maximum given y =1 ,n a m e l y
∂πb(B(1),y0,S)
∂b =0 .T h i s
concludes the proof.
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